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History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and 
Technology 
Gregory N. Mandel∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Our society thrives on new technology and technological 
advance.  We enjoy the internet, clothes that do not wrinkle or 
stain, and the wonders of medical biotechnology.  A century of 
innovation has improved our lives in myriad ways.  We are 
healthier, wealthier, and, if not necessarily happier, have a 
vastly greater variety of options for how to spend our leisure 
time. 
The marvels of technological advance are not always risk-
free.  The risks presented by new technologies can take varying 
forms: deleterious effects on human health or the environment, 
concerns about individual autonomy and privacy, or concerns 
relating to community or moral values.  Such risks and 
perceived risks often create new issues and disputes to which 
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The history lessons do not produce a complete road map for 
responding to each new law and technology issue — such a 
guide is not achievable considering the vast variety of 
technological change.  But the lessons do provide a number of 
useful guidelines for how to confront novel law and technology 
challenges.  In this symposium article, I propose three lessons: 
(1) that preexisting legal categories may no longer apply for 
new law and technology issues; (2) that decision-makers be 
careful to avoid being blinded by the marvels of new technology 
in deciding law and technology cases; and (3) that the types of 
new law and technology disputes can be unforeseeable.  These 
are just three examples of useful lessons; they are not intended 
to be a comprehensive list, and more suggestions are welcome.  
Critically for any discussion of a general theory of law and 
technology, I contend that these guidelines are applicable 
across a wide variety of technologies, even those that we cannot 
conceive of presently. 
the legal system must respond.  Are various means of copying 
information via the internet copyright infringement?  Do the 
nanofibers that confer beneficial properties to clothing pose 
health or environmental risks?  Is it acceptable to conduct 
embryonic stem cell research? 
The new legal issues created by technological advance 
frequently are quite challenging.  Such issues often raise 
questions that are at the forefront of scientific knowledge, and 
therefore may not only be incomprehensible to the average 
person, but also not fully (or even well) understood by scientific 
experts in the relevant field.  In addition, the issues often 
present new variations that challenge current understandings 
of the law, even where the limits of scientific knowledge are not 
critical to the issue’s resolution.  In the face of this limited 
knowledge and understanding, generally lay legislative, 
executive, administrative, and judicial actors must continue to 
establish and rule on laws that govern and decide such 
uncharted disputes. 
My contribution to this symposium, concerning whether 
and to what extent there can be a general theory of law and 
technology, focuses on lessons that can be learned from past 
responses to once-new legal issues created by technological 
advance.  Studying how prior law and technology issues were 
handled, and particularly how they were sometimes 
mishandled, provides valuable lessons for responding to 
current and future law and technology issues as they arise. 
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I. OLD CATEGORIES MAY NO LONGER APPLY 
The claim that lessons from one technology can be exported 
to another technology is supported by examining the legal 
system’s reaction to historic technological advances.  Lessons 
learned from these analyses are applicable today, even though 
the technologies to which we would apply them now were 
inconceivable in the periods from which the lessons are derived. 
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the 
history of legal responses to technological advance is that a 
decision-maker must be careful when compartmentalizing a 
new law and technology issue into a preexisting category.  
Lawyers and judges are trained to work in a system of 
precedent that depends on categorizing cases according to 
existing legal rules.  The routine response to new issues, not 
surprisingly, is to try to analogize them to existing legal 
categorization.  Such a response is often rational.  But, where 
the new issue arises as a result of technological change, the old 
categories may no longer apply.  In order to handle a new 
technology issue, one often must delve deeper, into the basis for 
the existing system of legal categorization.  Examples from the 
Nineteenth century illustrate this point. 
A. THE TELEGRAPH 
Before fiber optics and Wi-Fi, the first means of 
contemporaneous long-distance communication was the 
telegraph.  On May 24, 1844, Samuel Morse sent the world’s 
first telegraph message, “What Hath God Wrought.”1  
Telegraph infrastructure rose hand-in-hand with the railroads, 
and in a short time (on a nineteenth century technological 
diffusion scale), both criss-crossed the country and were in 
heavy use.2 
Unsurprisingly, the advent of the telegraph also brought 
new legal disputes.  One such type of dispute was contract 
disputes concerning miscommunicated telegraph messages.3  
 
 1. See Library of Congress, American Memory, Today in History: May 
24, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/may24.html (last visited Apr. 7, 
2007). This message was taken from the Bible, Numbers 33:23.  It was 
suggested to Morse by Annie Ellworth, daughter of a friend.  Library of 
Congress, supra. 
 2. See Inventors.About.com, History of the Telegraph and Telegraphy, 
http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bltelegraph.htm (last visited Apr. 
07, 2007). 
 3. See, e.g., Parks v. Alta Cal. Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 422 (Cal. 1859). 
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At first glance, this may appear to present a standard contract 
issue, but analysis of a pair of cases reveals otherwise. 
Parks v. Alta California Telegraph Co.4 concerned a 
contract under which Alta was to send a telegraph message for 
Parks.5  Alta failed to send the message in a timely manner, 
causing a loss for Parks, and Parks sued Alta to recover for the 
loss.6  The outcome of the case hinged on whether a telegraph 
company was a common carrier.7  Common carriers, such as 
companies that transported goods, were automatically insurers 
of the delivery of the goods.8  If Alta was a common carrier, it 
necessarily insured delivery of Parks’ message, and would be 
liable for Parks’ loss.9  In contrast, if Alta was not a common 
carrier, it did not insure delivery of the message, and would 
only be liable for the cost of the telegraph.10 
The court held that telegraph companies were common 
carriers.11  Companies that delivered goods, prior to telegraphs, 
also delivered letters.12  These companies, therefore, 
automatically insured delivery of the letters they were 
carrying, and were liable for any delivery failures.13  The court 
reasoned, “[t]here is no difference in the general nature of the 
legal obligation of the contract between carrying a message 
along a wire and carrying goods or a package along a route.  
The physical agency may be different, but the essential nature 
of the contract is the same.”14  Other than this relatively 
circular reasoning about the “essential nature” and there being 
“no difference,” the court did not further explain the basis for 
its conclusion.  In the Parks court’s view, “[t]he rules of law 
which govern the liability of Telegraph Companies are not new.  
 
 4. See id. at 424. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. at 423-24. 
 8. See id. at 424-25. 
 9. See id. at 423. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. at 424. 
 12. See, e.g., Gordon Stimmell, U.S. Carrier, Locals, & Independent Mails, 
http://www.uspcs.org/uspcsCarriers_Locals.html (last visited, Apr. 07, 2007) (a 
history of private mail services).  See also United States Postal Service, 
History of the US Postal Service, 1779-1993, 
http://www.usps.com/history/his2.htm (last visited Apr. 07, 2007). 
 13. See Parks, 13 Cal. at 424-25. 
 14. Id. at 424. 
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They are old rules applied to new circumstances.”15  The court 
analogized the delivery of a message by telegraph to the 
delivery of a message (a letter) by physical means, and since 
letter-carriers were common carriers, it concluded that 
telegraph companies must be as well.16 
Breese v. U.S. Telegraph Co.17 also concerned a dispute 
over a telegraph message.  Breese contracted with U.S. 
Telegraph to send a telegraph message to buy $700 worth of 
gold.18  The message received was to buy $7,000 in gold.19  
Unfortunately, the price of gold dropped, and Breese sued U.S. 
Telegraph for the loss.20  Here, U.S. Telegraph’s form for 
sending a telegraph included a notation that, for important 
messages, the sender should always have the message sent 
back, at an additional charge, to ensure that there were no 
errors in delivery.21  The form stated that if the message was 
not repeated, U.S. Telegraph was not responsible for any 
error.22 
Like Parks, Breese hinged on whether a telegraph company 
was a common carrier.23  If telegraph companies were common 
carriers, U.S. Telegraph was necessarily an insurer of delivery 
of the message, and could not limit its liability as it attempted 
on the telegraph form.24  The court concluded that telegraph 
companies are not common carriers.25  It did not offer a 
reasoned explanation for its conclusion, beyond stating that the 
law of contract governs,26 a point irrelevant to the issue of 
whether telegraph companies are common carriers. 
Though Parks and Breese reached different conclusions, 
both courts based their decisions on whether telegraph 
companies were common carriers.27  The Parks court believed 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. at 425 (“The process of ascertainment is the same in this as in 
other cases of carriers.”). 
 17. Breese v. U.S. Telegraph Co., 48 N.Y. 132 (N.Y. 1871). 
 18. See id. at 136. 
 19. See id. at 137. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 133. 
 22. See id. at 133-34. 
 23. See id. at 132. 
 24. See id. at 141. 
 25. See id. at 142. 
 26. See id. at 139. 
 27. See id. at 142; Parks v. Alta Cal. Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 422, 425 (Cal. 
1859). 
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that telegraph messages were not relevantly different from 
previous methods of message delivery, and therefore that 
telegraph companies were common carriers.28  The Breese 
court, on the other hand, considered telegraph messages to be a 
new form of message delivery, distinguishable from prior 
systems, and therefore not bound by the old common carrier 
rules, but only by contract.29  Our analysis need not determine 
which court had the better view.30  The comparison, however, 
reveals two important points: (1) neither court engaged in the 
appropriate analysis to determine whether telegraph 
companies should be held to be common carriers, and (2) 
neither court engaged in the appropriate analysis to determine 
whether a telegraph company should be liable for an error in 
delivery of a telegraph message. 
New legal issues created by technological advance often 
raise the question of whether the technology is similar enough 
to the prior state of the art such that the new technology should 
be governed by similar, existing rules, or whether the new 
technology is different enough such that it should be governed 
by new or different rules.  This question cannot be resolved 
simply by comparing the function of the new technology to the 
function of the prior technology.  Rather, a decision-maker 
must consider the rationale for the existing legal categories in 
the first instance, and then determine whether that rationale 
applies to the new technology.  Legal categories (such as 
common carrier) are only that — legal constructs.  Such 
constructs may need to be revised in the face of technological 
change. 
The relevant metric by which the extension of the common 
carrier category should have been evaluated was not the 
physical activity involved (message delivery) but the basis for 
the legal construct.  The rationale for common carrier liability, 
for instance, may have been to institute a least-cost avoider 
 
 28. See Parks, 13 Cal. at 425. 
 29. See Breese v. U.S. Telegraph Co., 48 N.Y. 132, 139 (N.Y. 1871). 
 30. This is not a simple doctrinal question.  A common carrier is one who 
holds themselves out to the public as engaged in the business of 
transportation of persons or property for compensation.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed. 2004) (“A commercial enterprise that holds itself out 
to the public as offering to transport freight or passengers for a fee.”).  To 
determine whether a telegraph company is a common carrier under this 
definition, one would have to determine whether a telegraph message is 
property. 
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regime and reduce transaction costs (likely among other 
reasons).31  Prior to the advent of the telegraph, there was little 
a customer could do to insure the proper delivery of her 
package or letter once handed to a carrier.  Telegraphs, 
however, offered a new, easy, cheap method of self-insurance, 
as revealed in Breese—having the message returned to ensure 
that it had been properly delivered.32  It is possible that this 
change in technology was substantial enough that the old legal 
rules should no longer apply.  But, this is an analysis that 
neither court reached. 
That preexisting legal categorization might not apply to 
new technologies may appear to be a simple error that we 
would not expect today’s courts to make.  Chalking up this legal 
error to archaic legal decision-making, however, is too 
dismissive, as cases concerning modern message delivery 
reveal. 
B. THE INTERNET 
The growth of the internet and email usage in the 1990s 
resulted in a dramatic increase in unsolicited email messages.  
These messages became known as “spam,” apparently after a 
famous Monty Python skit in which spam is a disturbingly 
ubiquitous menu item.33  Spam was (and is) a significant 
annoyance for email users.  However, it is potentially an even 
greater problem for internet service providers who are forced to 
make additional investments to process and store extra 
messages or face the prospect of losing customers annoyed by 
spam filling their in-boxes.34 
 
 
One internet provider, CompuServe, brought suit against a 
 
 31. See Eli M. Noam, Principles for the Communications Act of 2034: The 
Superstructure of Infrastructure, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 317, 320 (1994). 
 32. See Breese, 48 N.Y. at 134. 
 33. See Dictionary.com, Definition of “Spam,” 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spam (last visited Apr. 07, 2007). 
 34. Although private solutions to the spam problem (email message 
filters) would eventually work with some degree of success, they were not 
particularly well developed in the early days of spam.  See, e.g., CompuServe 
Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017-19 (S.D. Ohio 1997).  
The current generation of spammers, however, have now figured out how to 
evade these email filters, making spam more of a problem than it has been in 
several years.  See Dan Woog & Carolynn Ananian, Spam, Spam, Everywhere, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2006, at A18. 
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particularly persistent spammer.35  CompuServe had 
attempted to technologically block the spam, but had not been 
successful.36  CompuServe, however, had a problem in 
developing a legal theory for its lawsuit.  Use of the 
CompuServe email system by a non-client did not create an 
obvious cause of action in contract, tort, property, or other area 
of law.  In fact, such use, as a general matter, was highly 
desired and necessary for the email system to operate—
CompuServe’s clients needed to be able to receive email from 
others. 
CompuServe developed a somewhat ingenious claim—that 
the spammer was trespassing on CompuServe’s personal 
property (its computers) violating an ancient doctrine known as 
trespass to chattels.37  Trespass to chattels is a common law 
doctrine prohibiting the unauthorized use of another’s personal 
property.38  Trespass to chattels, however, requires physical 
contact with the chattel, that the plaintiff was dispossessed of 
the chattel permanently or for a substantial period of time, and 
that the chattel was impaired in condition, quality or value, or 
that bodily harm was caused.39  Application of these elements 
to spam is not straight-forward.  Spam does not physically 
contact a computer, does not appear to dispossess a computer, 
and does not appear to harm the computer.  CompuServe 
argued, and the court held, however, that the electronic signals 
by which the email was sent constituted physical contact with 
the chattel, that the use of band-width dispossessed the 
computer, and that the value of CompuServe’s computers was 
diminished by the burden of the mass spamming.40 
While one can understand the court’s sympathy for 
CompuServe’s plight, the CompuServe court committed the 
same error as the courts in Parks and Breese—it did not 
consider the basis for legal categorization before extending a 
category to new disputes created by new technology.  Clear 
extensions of the CompuServe holding make evident that the 
court’s categorization was problematic.  All unsolicited email, 
physical mail, and telephone calls would constitute trespass to 
 
 35. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1015. 
 36. Id. at 1019. 
 37. Id. 
 38. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1542-43 (8th ed. 2004). 
 39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965). 
 40. Compuserve, 962 F. Supp. at 1022. 
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chattels under this reasoning, a holding that would surprise 
many.  This result would create a common law cause of action 
against telemarketers and companies sending junk mail.41  
Even more surprising, advertisements on broadcast radio and 
television would also constitute trespass to chattels.  Under the 
court’s reasoning, individuals would have a cause of action 
against ABC, CBS, and NBC for airing commercials, which 
physically contact the television through electronic signals, 
dispossess the television to at least the same extent as spam 
affects a computer, and diminish the value of the television by 
carrying the extraneous material.42  An argument that a 
television viewer should expect or implicitly consents to 
commercials would apply equally to a computer user expecting 
or implicitly consenting to spam as a result of connecting to the 
internet. 
The problem with the CompuServe decision lies in its 
failure to recognize the difference between use of an (ethereal) 
email system and use of physical property.  This technological 
difference makes a difference for the legal categories into which 
the disputes should be placed.  The dispute in CompuServe was 
not really over the use of physical property (computers), but 
over interference with CompuServe’s business and customers.  
The legal solution to this new type of problem would have been 
better served by recognizing this difference. 
In sum, courts should not expect that common law, often 
developed centuries earlier, will be well-suited for handling 
new law and technology issues.  The preexisting categories may 
be applicable in some cases, but the only way to determine this 
is to examine the basis for the categories in the first instance, 
and whether that basis is satisfied by extension of the doctrine.  
This analysis will vary for different disputes and technologies, 
and often will require consideration of the impact of the 
decision on the development and dissemination of the 
technology, as well as on the economy and social welfare. 
II. DO NOT BE BLINDED BY THE TECHNOLOGY 
A second history lesson for law and technology concerns 
the need for decision-makers to look beyond the technology 
 
 41. Many, presumably, would welcome such a cause of action, but this is a 
different question from whether it is appropriate or was intended. 
 42. Trespass to chattels arguably would not apply to cable providers, who 
have entered a contract with the cable customer, and therefore presumably 
have received implicit consent to transmit the commercials. 
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involved in a dispute to focus on the legal issues in question.  
Sometimes decision-makers have a tendency to be blinded by 
spectacular technological achievement. 
People v. Jennings43 was the first case in the United States 
in which fingerprint evidence was admitted to establish 
identity.  Jennings was charged with murder.  Critical to the 
case against Jennings was the testimony of four fingerprint 
experts matching Jennings’ fingerprints to the prints of four 
fingers from a left hand found at the scene of the crime.44 
The fingerprint experts were employed in police 
departments and other law enforcement capacities.45  They 
testified, in varying manners, to certain numbers of points of 
resemblance between Jennings’ fingerprints and the crime 
scene prints, and each concluded that the prints were made by 
the same person.46  The court admitted the testimony as expert 
scientific evidence.  The bases for admission identified in the 
opinion were that fingerprint evidence was already admitted in 
European countries, reliance on encyclopedias and treatises on 
criminal investigation, and the experience of the expert 
witnesses themselves.47 
Upon examination, the bases for admission are weak and 
fail to establish the critical evidentiary requirement of 
reliability.  None of the encyclopedias or treatises cited 
discussed scientific support for the use of fingerprints to 
establish identity, let alone demonstrating its reliability.48  In a 
similar vein, the court identified that the four expert witnesses 
each had been studying fingerprint identification for several 
years, but never mentions any testimony or other evidence 
concerning the reliability of fingerprint analysis itself.  
Identification of a number of points of resemblance between 
prints (an issue on which the expert testimony varied) provides 
little evidence of identity without knowing how many points of 
resemblance are needed for a match, how likely it is for there to 
be a number of points of resemblance between different people, 
or how likely it is for experts to incorrectly identify points of 
resemblance.  No evidence on these matters was provided. 
 
 43. 252 Ill. 534 (Ill. 1911). 
 44. Id. at 548-49. 
 45. Id. at 547-48. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 546-47. 
 48. Id. 
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Reading the Jennings opinion, one is left with the 
impression that the court was simply very impressed with the 
idea of fingerprint identification.  Fingerprinting was perceived 
to be an exciting new scientific ability and crime-fighting tool.  
The court, for instance, provides substantial description of the 
experts’ qualifications and their testimony, despite its failure to 
discuss the reliability of fingerprint identification.49  It is not 
surprising, considering the court’s amazement with fingerprint 
identification, that the court deferred to the experts in 
admitting the evidence, despite the lack of evidence of 
reliability and the experts’ obvious self-interest in having the 
testimony admitted—this was, after all, now their line of 
employment. 
Jump forward from fingerprint identification at the 
beginning of the twentieth century to DNA identification at the 
end of the century.  Oregon v. Lyons50 concerned the 
admissibility of a new method of DNA typing, the “PCR 
replicant method,” a process for determining the probability of 
a match between a defendant’s DNA and DNA obtained at the 
scene of a crime.51 
Despite almost a century gap separating the opinions, the 
similarity in deficiencies between the Jennings and Lyons 
courts’ analyses of the admissibility of a new form of scientific 
evidence are remarkable.  In Lyons, the court similarly relies 
on the use of the method in question in other fields as a basis 
for its reliability in a criminal case.  The PCR method had been 
used in genetics, but only in limited ways in the field of 
forensics.52  No evidence was provided concerning the 
reliability of the PCR replicant method under crime scene 
conditions.  The Lyons court also relied on the expert witness’s 
own testimony that he followed proper protocols as evidence 
that there was no error and, even more problematically, that 
the method itself was reliable.53  Finally, the PCR replicant 
method expert also had a vested interest in the test being 
considered reliable—again, this was his line of employment.  In 
both cases the courts appear simply impressed and excited by 
the technology.  The Lyons decision includes not only a lengthy 
description of the PCR replicant method process, but also an 
 
 49. Id. at 546-49. 
 50. 863 P.2d 1303 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). 
 51. See id. at 1306. 
 52. Id. at 1309. 
 53. Id. at 1309-10. 
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extended discussion of DNA, all of which turns out to be 
irrelevant to the issue of reliabili
In fairness to the courts, there was an additional similarity 
between Jennings and Lyons: in both cases the defense failed to 
introduce competing experts to challenge the reliability of the 
identification evidence. 
In DNA typing cases, defense attorneys learned to 
introduce their own experts to challenge the admissibility of 
new forms of DNA typing.55  These experts challenged 
proffered DNA evidence on numerous grounds, from problems 
with the theory of DNA identification (such as assumptions 
about population genetics) to problems with the method’s 
execution (such as the lack of laboratory standards or 
procedures).56  These challenges led geneticists and biologists 
to air disputes concerning DNA typing in scientific journals, 
and eventually to the National Research Council convening two 
distinguished panels on the matter.57  A number of significant 
problems were identified concerning methods of DNA 
identification, and courts in some instances held DNA evidence 
inadmissible.58  Eventually, new procedures were instituted 
and standardized, and sufficient data was gathered such that 
courts now routinely admit DNA e
The challenges to DNA identification methods actually led, 
in turn, to challenges to the admissibility of fingerprint 
identification evidence, an issue which still had not been 
adequately addressed despite its long use and mythical status 
in crime-solving lore.60  The bases for these challenges included 
the lack of objective and proven standards for establishing that 
two prints match, the lack of an established error rate,61 and 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA 
Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 51-56 (2001). 
 56. See, e.g., People v. Mohit 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 991-93 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
1992) (challenging DNA based on an uncommon ancestry); People v. Castro, 
545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (challenging the procedures 
used in the testing laboratory); Mnookin, supra note 55, at 51-56. 
 57. See JAMES F. CROW ET AL., COMMITTEE ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA (NAT’L ACAD. 
PRESS 1996), available at http://newton.nap.edu/html/DNA/. 
 58. See, e.g., Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999. 
 59. See Mnookin, supra note 56, at 54-56. 
 60. Id. at 57-70. 
 61. A 1995 proficiency test of fingerprint examiners, for instance, found 
that slightly less than half of them received a perfect score; 22% made an 
MANDEL G. History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 2007;8(2):551-570. 
2007] HISTORY LESSONS  563 
                                                
the lack of statistical information concerning the likelihood that 
two people would have fingerprints with a given number of 
corresponding features.62  In 2002, a district court judge held 
that evidence of identity based on fingerprints was 
inadmissible because it was unreliable.63  This holding led to 
somewhat of an uproar and the Unites States filed a motion to 
reconsider.  The court held a hearing on the accuracy of 
fingerprint identification, at which two FBI agents testified.  
The court reversed its earlier decision and admitted the 
fingerprint testimony.64 
The lesson learned from these cases for law and technology 
is relatively straight-forward: decision-makers must not get 
blinded by the wonder or promise of new technology when 
judging the new legal issues created by impressive 
technological advance.  It is a lesson that is easy to state, but 
clearly more difficult to apply in practice, particularly when a 
decision-maker is confronted with the new technology for the 
first time and a cadre of experts testifies to its spectacular 
abilities. 
III. NEW TECHNOLOGY DISPUTES ARE 
UNFORESEEABLE 
The final history lesson for a general theory of law and 
technology offered in this article is the most difficult to 
implement: decision-makers must remain cognizant of the 
limits of their knowledge and ability to foresee new technology 
issues.  It is inevitable that legal disputes concerning the new 
technology will be handled under the preexisting legal scheme 
in early stages of technological development.  At this stage, 
there often will not be enough information and knowledge 
about nascent technologies to develop or modify appropriate 
legal rules, or there may not have been enough time to 
establish new statutes, regulations, or common law for 
managing the technology. 
 
erroneous identification, identifying a match where none existed.  Id. at 59-60. 
 62. Id. at 57-70. 
 63. United States v. Llera-Plaza, Nos. CR. 98-362-10, CR. 98-362-11, 98-
362-12, 2002 WL 27305, at *517-18 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated and superseded, 
188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  The court, in perhaps a Solomonic twist, 
held that experts could testify to the similarities and differences between 
fingerprints, though the experts were not permitted to present evaluation 
testimony as to their opinion that a particular latent print was or was not the 
print of a particular person.  Id. 
 64. U.S. v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
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In addition, there often appears to be an inclination to 
handle new technology disputes under existing rules.65  This 
response is usually the easiest, both administratively and 
psychologically.  Not surprisingly, however, the preexisting 
legal structure may prove a poor match for new technology.  
Often there will be gaps or other problems with applying the 
existing legal system to a new technology issue.  The regulation 
of biotechnology serves as a useful example. 
A. BIOTECHNOLOGY 
As the biotechnology industry developed in the early 1980s, 
the federal government determined that bioengineered 
products generally would be regulated under the already-
existing statutory and regulatory structure.66  The basis for 
this decision, established in the Coordinated Framework for 
Regulation of Biotechnology, was a determination that the 
process of biotechnology was not considered inherently risky, 
and therefore that only the products of biotechnology, not the 
process itself, required oversight.67 
This decision was questionable.  As a result of the 
Coordinated Framework, biotechnology products are regulated 
under a dozen statutes and by five different agencies and 
services.68  Experience with biotechnology regulation under the 
Coordinated Framework has revealed gaps in biotechnology 
regulation; inefficient overlaps in regulation; inconsistencies 
among agencies in their regulation of similarly situated 
biotechnology products; and instances of agencies acting 
outside of their areas of expertise.69 
The most significant gap in biotechnology regulation is 
likely the lack of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
involvement in the review and approval of numerous 
genetically modified plants and animals that could have a 
 
 65. See Gregory Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and 
Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2257-58 (2004). 
 66. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 
23,302-09, 23,313-14, 23,336 (June 26, 1986). 
 67. See id. at 23,302-03.  See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 
25-26 (2000) [hereinafter NRC 2000 REPORT]. 
 68. Mandel, supra note 65, at 2228. 
 69. See, supra note 65, for a comprehensive discussion of the regulation of 
genetically modified products and related issues. 
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significant impact on the environment, and in certain instances 
the lack of sufficient review of the environmental impacts of 
such products by any agency.70  As another example, it is 
unclear whether any agency has regulatory authority over 
transgenic animals not intended for human food or to produce 
human biologics.71 
Regulatory inconsistencies have created difficulties as well.  
The Coordinated Framework identified two priorities for the 
regulation of biotechnology by multiple agencies: that the 
agencies regulating genetically modified products “adopt 
consistent definitions” and that the agencies implement 
scientific reviews of “comparable rigor.”72  As a result of 
constraints created by primary reliance on preexisting statutes, 
however, the agencies involved in the regulation of 
biotechnology define identical regulatory constructs 
differently.73  Similarly in violation of the Coordinated 
 
 70. See id. at 2234-36. 
 71. See OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, CASE STUDY NO. IV: FARM ANIMAL (GOAT) THAT PRODUCES 
HUMAN DRUGS 14 (2001), available at 
http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_study5.pdf.  It is possible that the Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) could exercise authority 
pursuant to the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA) of 2002, 7 U.S.C. §§ 
8301-8320 (2000 & Supp. 2003), to regulate genetically modified animals to 
the extent such animals may affect the health of livestock (in much the same 
manner as APHIS regulates genetically modified plants based on their 
potential to pose threats to plants).  See Tadlock Cowan & Geoffrey S. Becker, 
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: 
STATUS AND CURRENT ISSUES (2006) (noting this potential).  APHIS authority 
here would turn on the meaning of “disease” under the AHPA, a term to be 
defined by the Secretary of Agriculture.  7 U.S.C. § 8302(3).  The Secretary 
may be able to define disease in such a manner as to include genetic 
modification of animals, although this would not be consistent with how the 
Secretary has defined the term previously, so whether such a definition would 
survive judicial review is not clear.  See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 319.59-1 (2004) 
(defining “disease” in another agricultural context to include “its common 
meaning [and] a disease agent which incites a disease”).  In addition, the 
legislative history of the AHPA is quite sparse and does not indicate that such 
a broad interpretation was intended. 
 72. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 
23,302-03 (June 26, 1986). 
 73. Genetically modified pest-protected plants, for example, are regulated 
by three different agencies, each of which identify the regulated product and 
define the regulated substance differently, as the following table reveals: 





Plant pest, regulated 
article. 
Food, feed, food 
additive. 
MANDEL G. History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 2007;8(2):551-570. 
566 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:2 
 
                                                
 
Framework priorities, the National Research Council has 
specifically noted that the data on which different agencies 
base comparable analyses, and the scientific stringency with 
which they conduct their analyses, are not comparably 
rigorous.74 
Regulatory overlap also has been a problem for 
biotechnology.  Multiple agencies have authority over similar 
issues, resulting in inefficient duplication of regulatory 
resources and effort.75  In certain instances, different agencies 
request the same information about the same biotechnology 
product from the same firms, but do not share the information 
or coordinate their work.76  The worst case scenario for overlap 
is for agencies to reach differing conclusions concerning the 
same product.  This occurred for two agencies reviewing the 
potential for transgenic cotton to cross with wild cotton in parts 
of the United States.  One agency concluded that “[n]one of the 
relatives of cotton found in the United States . . . show any 
definite weedy tendencies,”77 while another found that there 
would be a risk of transgenic cotton crossing with species of 
wild cotton in southern Florida, southern Arizona, and 
Hawaii.78 
Agency inexperience also has proven problematic in the 
regulation of biotechnology.  In 1998 the EPA approved a 





and genetic material 
necessary for its 
production. 
Organism engineered 
to contain sequences from 
plant pests. 
Human food (whole 
or processed), 
animal feed. 
See NRC 2000 REPORT, supra note 67, at 159 (the table reproduced above has 
been modified to reflect changes to agency definitions since the table was 
originally published). 
 74. See NRC 2000 REPORT, supra note 67, at 170-71. 
 75. Mandel, supra note 65, at 2243-44. 
 76. See id. at 2244. 
 77. JOHN H. PAYNE, USDA /APHIS PETITION 97-013-01P FOR 
DETERMINATION OF NONREGULATED STATUS FOR EVENTS 31807 AND 31808 
COTTON: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT 
IMPACT 6 (1997), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702230537/http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech
/dec_docs/9701301p_ea.HTM. 
 78. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BIOPESTICIDES REGISTRATION 
ACTION DOCUMENT IIC9-IIC10 (2000), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oscpmont/sap/meetings/2000/october/brad3_enviroassessm
ent.pdf. 
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to be pest-resistant.79  StarLink corn was only approved for use 
as animal feed and non-food industrial purposes, such as 
ethanol production; it was not approved for human 
consumption because it carries transgenic genes that express a 
protein containing some attributes of known human 
allergens.80 
In September 2000, StarLink corn was discovered in 
various brands of taco shells and later in many other human 
food products, eventually resulting in the recall of over three 
hundred products.81  Several of the United States’ largest food 
producers were forced to stop production at certain plants due 
to concerns about StarLink contamination, and there was a 
sharp reduction in United States corn exports.82  The owner of 
the StarLink registration agreed to buy back the year’s entire 
crop of StarLink corn, at a cost of about $100 million.83  It was 
anticipated that StarLink-related costs could end up running 
as high as $1 billion.84 
It turned out that the same harvesting, storage, shipping, 
and processing equipment are often used for both human and 
animal food.85  Corn from myriad farms is commingled as it is 
gathered, stored, and transported.86  In fact, due to recognized 
commingling, the agricultural industry regularly accepts about 
2-7% of foreign matter in bulk shipments of corn in the United 
States.87  In addition, growers of StarLink corn had been 
inadequately warned about the need to keep StarLink corn 
segregated from other corn, leading to further commingling in 
grain elevators.88 
 
 79. See Sutter v. Aventis CropScience USA Holding, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 
1050, 1052 (S.D. Iowa 2001). 
 80. See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 
(N.D. Ill. 2002); Sutter, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1052. 
 81. Mandel, supra note 65, at 2204. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Andrew Pollack, European Company Will Buy Entire Crop of Corn in 
Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2000, at C14. 
 84. James Cox, StarLink Fiasco Wreaks Havoc in the Heartland: 
Developer Wants EPA To Approve Seed for Food Supply, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 
2000, at 1B. 
 85. See In re StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Andrew Pollack, Labeling Genetically Altered Food Is Thorny Issue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at A1. 
 88. See Barnaby J. Feder, Farmers Cite Scarce Data In Corn Mixing: 
Companies’ Warnings Are Called Inadequate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at C1.  
See also In re StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 
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Someone with working knowledge of the country’s 
agricultural system would have recognized from the outset that 
it was inevitable that once StarLink corn was grown, produced, 
and processed on a large-scale basis, some of it would make its 
way into the human food supply.89  According to one 
agricultural expert, “[a]nyone who understands the grain 
handling system . . . would know that it would be virtually 
impossible to keep StarLink corn separate from corn that is 
used to produce human food.”90  The EPA, however, lacked the 
relevant expertise to recognize this problem, and failed to 
realize the limits of their experience in regulating pesticides 
when applied to a new technology. 
B. NANOTECHNOLOGY 
The admonition “to be aware of what you do not know and 
to recognize the limits of foresight” is clearly a difficult one to 
follow.  This lesson does, however, provide important guidance 
for handling new technology.  Most critically, it highlights the 
need for legal regimes governing new technologies to be flexible 
and reveals that it should be anticipated that preexisting legal 
regimes may run into problems when being used to govern 
technology that did not exist when the legal regimes were 
created. 
A leading current candidate for application of these 
understandings is the management of nanotechnology.  
Nanotechnology concerns the ability to build matter atom by 
atom.  This capability has only recently been scientifically 
realized, and will increasingly impact a vast array of 
industries, including medicine and health care, materials 
science, electronics and computers, and optics.91  
Nanotechnology development and commercialization already is 
raising, and will continue to raise, concerns regarding risks to 
human health, safety, and the environment.92  Knowledge 
 
 89. George Anthan, OK Sought for Corn in Food, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 
26, 2000, at 1D.  The EPA later acknowledged “that the limited approval for 
StarLink was unworkable.” Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See National Nanotechnology Initiative, Nanotech Facts, 
http://www.nano.gov/html/facts/home_facts.html (last visited Apr. 07, 2007). 
 92. See generally Gregory Mandel, Governing Nanotechnology 
(unpublished manuscript).  Some potential risks of nanomaterials include 
toxicity due to inhalation, ingestion, or dermal contact with nanomaterials.  
Id. 
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concerning these risks is extremely limited because of the 
nascent stage of the technology.93  In addition, the risks are 
extremely difficult to characterize because matter behaves 
differently at the nanoscale.94  Due to differences that result 
from nanomaterials’ low weight, high surface-area-to-weight 
ratio, and potential indestructibility, a compound that is 
innocuous at the macroscale may have a significantly different 
risk profile when it is only several atoms in size.95 As the 
ability to manufacture engineered nanomaterials is a recent 
technological achievement, research into the health and 
environmental effects of nanomaterials is in its infancy and is 
permeated by uncertainty.96 
Undoubtedly, nanotechnology development will raise new 
legal issues, some of which are beginning to be perceived, 
others of which are entirely unforeseeable at this time.97  As 
the legal system evolves to handle nanotechnology issues, it is 
important to remember the lessons learned from past 
technology development.  A legal system that is flexible, 
recognizes the unpredictability of new issues, realizes that new 
issues may not fit well into preexisting legal constructs, and 
which is operated by legal actors who take a measured view of 
the technology will operate far better in managing 
nanotechnology than a system that fails to learn these lessons. 
CONCLUSION 
This article presents several lessons concerning the legal 
system’s adaptation to new legal issues brought about by 
technological advance, and explains how these lessons can be 
applied to future law and technology issues.  One critique of 
these lessons as a theory of law and technology is that the 
theory is actually a general legal theory, not one limited to law 
and technology.  The suggestions to consider the legal basis for 
existing doctrines before extending them to new application, for 
instance, is appropriate for all manner of legal decisions, not 
just law and technology.  This critique has some merit, but also 
 
 93. Rick DelVecchio, Berkeley Considering Need for Nano Safety, S. F. 
CHRON., Nov. 24, 2006, at A1. 
 94. See Mandel, supra note 92. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. For example, many health and environmental statutes are based on 
the assumption that chemical uses or releases below certain mass or quantity 
thresholds do not present a significant risk.  Nanomaterial toxicity may not 
adhere to these previous assumptions and understandings.  Id. 
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is limited.  There are two overarching reasons why the theory 
presented here is one of law and technology in particular.  
First, certain of the lessons offered are applicable only to law 
and technology issues—for example, that legal decision-makers 
should not let their amazement with new technology overrun 
their legal analysis, or that legal regimes developed prior to the 
advent of a technology often reveal gaps and other problems 
when applied to new technology issues.  Second, for those 
lessons that have significant applicability outside of law and 
technology, the interaction of technological development and 
the legal system renders the lessons particularly pertinent for 
resolving new technological disputes.  Determining the basis 
for legal constructs before extending them applies in many 
situations.  But, the nature of technological advance means 
that recognition of this consideration is a ubiquitous concern 
for handling new legal disputes caused by technological 
advance, not just the occasional concern presented in other 
areas. 
Despite the indescribably diverse manners of technological 
advance, and the correspondingly diverse range of new legal 
issues that arise in relation to such advance, the legal system’s 
response to new law and technology issues reveals important 
similarities.  These similarities provide lessons for a general 
theory of law and technology.  Each lesson will not apply 
equally to every new law and technology dispute, but the 
lessons do provide valuable guidance for adapting law to a wide 
variety of future technological advances. 
